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Public-Private Partnerships: Determinants of the type of governance 
structure 
Despite the spread of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and their interest among 
academicians and policy-makers, many investigations generally treat them as a 
homogenous mode of governance neglecting their different forms. The present 
work investigates the factors that determine the concrete form of PPP finally 
adopted. We use the Transaction Costs Theory (TCT) to analyse 11,821 PPPs in 
110 developing countries from 1997 to 2017. The results show that the greater 
the amount of specific investment and the more unfavourable the context in 
which it is implemented, PPP adopts forms where the private party has a greater 
degree of control.  
Keywords: public-private partnership; governance structure; transaction costs 
theory; uncertainty; asset specificity  
 
1. Introduction 
A public-private partnership (PPP) refers to an agreement between the public and the 
private sectors, in which some of the services or tasks that are the responsibility of the 
public sector are provided by the private sector under a clear agreement of shared 
objectives in order to supply a public service or infrastructure (Carbonara et al., 2014).  
This kind of cooperation has particularities that differentiate it from traditional 
organisational forms, which suppose a challenge for the public management. The most 
significant are the following: the commonly long duration of PPP, the funding of the 
project (where the private sector has a relevant role), the participation of a private party 
in different stages of the project (design, completion, implementation and/or funding) 
and the distribution of the risk between the public and the private partners (Li et al., 
2005; Van Ham and Koppenjan, 2010; World Bank, 2016). 
This formula is well-received in recent decades because of some advantages. A 
PPP allows the public management to benefit from the participation of the private sector 
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in funding and managing public service expansion by outsourcing risk to private entities 
(Li et al., 2005; Chou and Pramudawardhani, 2015). This allows for the utilisation of 
the skills, experience and technology innovation of the private party by the contractor 
(Li et al., 2005), which could improve the operational efficiency of the public assets 
(Edkins and Smyth, 2006). Consequently, the government can use its financial 
capability to undertake other types of activities and concentrate on its core competencies 
or abilities, by focusing on policymaking, planning and regulation (Felsinger, 2011). 
However, despite the advantages of PPPs, they can also present some drawbacks. This 
formula can be used to hide and defer public debt (Buso et al, 2017) and could present 
extra costs especially in developing countries due to corruption (Hopkin and Rodríguez-
Pose, 2007) or their lack of experience in its implementation (Bhattacharya et al, 2014). 
Given the importance of PPPs, most studies focus on identifying the risk or 
critical factors of their implementation for the public and private parties (e.g. Shen et al., 
2006; Wang et al, 2018c). However, these studies obtain mixed results due to several 
reasons (Hodge, 2004; Li et al., 2005; Marques and Berg, 2011). First, studies do not 
consider the same list of risks, partly because they do not focus on their sources (i.e. the 
uncertainty) (Wang et al, 2018c). Second, academic papers do not establish differences 
between types of PPPs, while there are different forms that may shape the criticality of 
the factors for each party (Cui et al., 2018; Van Den Hurk and Verhoest, 2016). And 
third, studies do not consider the link between the PPP type adopted and the specific 
characteristics of the service provided (e.g., its activity or investment amount) (Chang, 
2013) and the uncertainty sources where it is located, which some of them can arise 
from the context in which they operate (Cui et al., 2018). In fact, numerous studies pay 
attention to the distinctive characteristics of the factors that affect PPPs in developing 
economies (Pessoa, 2008; Akintoye and Beck, 2009; Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2017). 
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Countries transit through different economic development stages (Lucas, 1988; 
Schumpeter, 2017). In the first ones, with lowest levels of development, countries are 
characterized by scarce endowments of productive factors and fragility of their 
economy (e.g. unstable macroeconomic conditions or underdeveloped legal system) 
(Porter and Schwab, 2008; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). While in the last stages of 
development, the most advanced economies already reached higher levels of these 
factors which may become less critical (e.g. macroeconomic stability or developed legal 
system) (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Ramírez and Fleta, 2016; World Economic 
Forum, 2017). For this reason, developing economies may present different PPP threats 
related to the greater uncertainty of their contexts (Pessoa, 2008; Liu et al, 2016; Osei-
Kyei and Chan, 2017). 
Precisely, the Transaction Costs Theory (TCT) allows us to cover these 
deficiencies and connect the aforementioned aspects. Thus both, the characteristics of 
the PPP such as the specificity of the assets (Jin and Doloi, 2008; Musawir et al. 2017), 
and the uncertainty of the context (Cardenas et al., 2017; Musawir et al., 2017), 
configure the global level of risk and, in consequence, the governance structure or type 
of PPP adopted (European Commission, 2004; World Bank, 2016). In this way, the 
greater the risk that is transferred to the private party, the PPP would adopt a specific 


















Source: Author elaboration based on European Commission (2004) and World Bank Group (2016). 
For these reasons, in the current study, we examine the following research 
question: How do the sources of uncertainty and characteristics of the transaction 
influence the type of  PPP adopted? We test it on 11,821 infrastructure projects from 
different sectors in 110 countries, from 1997 to 2017. The data come from countries 
considered by World Bank as developing economies, that is, excluding the most 
advanced ones. Some authors (Maurya and Srivastava, 2018) consider that in emerging 
economies, institutional voids, as unique constraints, limit the deployment of desired 
governance mechanisms to make PPPs succeed. Our rich dataset contributes to 
understand how the context along with other project and environment characteristics, 
affect to the type of PPP finally adopted. . 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section reviews the 
academic literature, to analyse how the PPP characteristics and uncertainties influence 
in the contract types and to formulate the hypotheses. In the third section, we explain 
the research method, variables, model and data set. In the fourth section, we show the 
results of testing the hypotheses. The fifth section includes the discussion of the results. 
Finally, the sixth section shows the main conclusions.  
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2. Theoretical background 
2.1. External uncertainty 
Uncertainty can arise from the external environment where the transaction takes place. 
It is associated with the basic conditions necessary for economic activity that cannot be 
directly controlled by the company (Niknazar and Bourgault, 2017; Zhao et al., 2004). 
The uncertainty increases with unstable economic, natural and social environments 
(Slangen and Van Tulder, 2009) that favour the occurrence of events beyond the control 
of the organisation, hindering productive activities (Abdi and Aulakh, 2012; Zhao et al., 
2004). PPPs’ academic literature specially identifies these risks with unstable 
macroeconomic conditions, such as the volatility of inflation and interest rates 
(Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos, 2008; Mota and Moreira, 2015), few developed 
financial markets (Xu et al., 2011), expropriation or nationalisation of assets (Marques 
and Berg, 2011) or social opposition to the project (Chung et al., 2010).  
Another source of external uncertainty is the lack of more specific factors in the 
environment needed for the productive activity. These factors include the level of 
endowment of basic infrastructures, education and health services, qualified labour or 
good market efficiency. The scarcity or low quality of them can block or make more 
expensive economic activities through the markets (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; 
Ramírez and Fleta, 2016; World Economic Forum, 2017).  
In addition, there is another external uncertainty related to instabilities caused by 
natural events that may affect the success of PPPs. These factors include circumstances, 
such as force majeure (e.g., floods, storms, etc.) (Li et al., 2005; Marques and Berg, 
2011), geotechnical conditions (Li et al., 2005) or other environmental influences 
(Marques and Berg, 2011; Romboutsos and Anagnostopoulos, 2008).  
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The external uncertainties and the capabilities of governments to deal with them 
are related to the degree of development of the countries. In less-developed countries, 
the same natural risks have more impact on economic activity than in more-developed 
ones because of the former’s lower capabilities to deal with such risks (Skidmore and 
Toya, 2002).  
Thus, more unstable environments hinder economic activities and increase 
external risks because the parties cannot rely on the proper functioning of the market 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008). In addition, less stable environments have more 
incidences that may affect the PPPs and, in consequence, are more complex to translate 
into contracts, making them more difficult to perform, monitor and enforce. For this 
reason, in less developed countries, vertical integration and hierarchy may be more 
necessary to take control of some external circumstances (Crocker and Masten, 1988; 
Luo, 2005).  
Economic literature stresses that external uncertainty related to economic 
instability and deficient productive conditions present more prevalence in developing 
countries. For this reason, studies consider its impact on PPPs in economies from Latin 
America, Africa and Asia (Galilea and Medda; 2010; Sharma, 2012); in smaller set of 
countries such as China, Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Yang et al, 2013); or specific 
countries such as India (Kurniawan et al, 2013), Sri Lanka (Appuhami et al, 2014), or 
Nigeria (Babatunde and Perera, 2017). Thus, we propose the following research 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1a (H1a). The higher the external uncertainty where the PPP is carried out, the higher 
the control by the private party through the type of PPP adopted. 
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2.2. Uncertainty due to contract compliance  
Another source of uncertainty is contract enforcement. To enforce contracts 
may present difficulties due to incompleteness, which reflects the difficulty of 
enumerating many contingencies and detailing the PPP specifications ex ante, making it 
very costly to change the PPP specifications once it is underway (Cruz and Marques, 
2012; Iossa and Martimort, 2016).  
For instance, there could be a situation where after signing the contract, the 
contracted organisation neglects those features that were not contained therein, in order 
to increase its profit (Milgrom and Roberts, 1993). Alternatively, the contracted 
organisation may require a price increase because of the difficulties of carrying out the 
service (Crocker and Reynolds, 1993). In these circumstances, difficulty of establishing 
and enforcing the agreed-upon conditions predisposes the investing organisation to 
control the activities internally instead of contracting them out in the market (Besanko 
et al., 2009).  
For this reason, the rule of law and degree of development of the legal 
framework are important (Iossa and Martimort, 2016). The legal ground rules establish 
the basis for production, exchange and distribution in the market (Oxley, 1999; 
Williamson, 1985). This approach points out that an adequate legal framework favours 
economic functioning since investors rely on secure property rights, and it facilitates 
investment in human and physical capital (Luo, 2005; Oxley, 1999).  
An economic system where property rights are fully developed and regulated not 
only allows for the exchange of goods and services more easily (Dixit, 2009; Mota and 
Moreira, 2015) but also guarantees compliance and resolution of conflicts or situations 
not reflected in a contract (Dixit, 2009; Iossa and Martimort, 2016).  
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In addition, a developed legal framework means having rules that regulate and 
allow more complex, novel or unique transactions to take place in a more efficient 
manner. Conflicts are resolved in an impartial and independent judicial system that does 
not favour any of the parties in conflict (La Porta et al., 2000). Thus, in the 
environments where there are developed regulatory frameworks to resolve or lessen the 
possibility of not fulfilling the contract, the investing party has less necessity of control, 
because the resolution of the conflicts falls under the legal framework (Oxley, 1999). 
This connects with the findings by Maurya and Srivastava (2018). These authors point 
out that in emerging economies, under weak judiciaries and poor law enforcement, 
governance arrangements are adapted for PPPs to address the institutional voids, taking 
to suboptimal contracting performance. In fact, from interviews with PPP managers in 
developing countries such as Nigeria (Babatunde and Perera, 2017), Ghana (Ameyab 
and Chan, 2013), Indonesia, China or Taiwan (Chou and Pramudawardhani, 2015), the 
authors highlight the importance of an adequate legal framework that guarantees 
property rights and regulation of partnerships. Thus, we propose the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1b (H1b). The higher the uncertainty, due to contract enforcement where the 
PPP is carried out, the higher the control of the private party through the type of PPP 
adopted. 
2.3. Behavioural uncertainty 
Uncertainty can also be caused by the agents´ behaviours when one of the parties 
acts opportunistically by hiding relevant information before signing the contract or by not 
acting as agreed after signing it (Jin and Doloi, 2008; Milgrom and Roberts, 1993; 
Williamson, 1979; Williamson, 1985). 
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Opportunistic behaviour, or behavioural uncertainty, can arise from both the 
contracted private company and the public contractor (Fleta-Asín and Muñoz, 2017). 
Thus, contracts have to contain safeguards that are designed to protect each party from 
the opportunistic behaviour of the other. Such safeguards are costly and include costs 
associated with negotiating, drafting and monitoring contracts (Chiles and McMacking, 
1996). One approach to controlling the behaviour of agents is to create rules usually in 
the form of written contracts. However, writing long-term complete contracts in PPPs is 
very problematic (Parker and Hartley, 2003), and if the contingencies that may occur in 
the transaction are not reflected in the document, agents can behave opportunistically 
(Abdi and Aulakh, 2012; Williamson, 1979).  
In this situation, trust between the parties may reduce transaction costs because 
they do not have to plan for all future contingencies, and they can carry out equitable 
adjustments as market conditions change where the regulatory framework does not 
apply (Benítez-Ávila et al. 2018; Brogaard, 2017; Dyer and Chu, 2003). Trust decreases 
drafting costs by allowing contracts to be specified more loosely without ex ante and ex 
post opportunistic behaviour, and it decreases monitoring costs because of each party´s 
confidence in the other´s performance (Adler, 2001; Chiles and McMackin, 1996). 
When trust is high, each party will assume that the other party is acting in good faith 
and will interpret behaviours in a more positive way (Abdi and Aulakh, 2012; Warsen et 
al., 2018), which can serve as a substitute for formal contracts and controls (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Lu et al., 2015).  
The specific risks associated with the lack of trust are identified by academics in 
PPPs, such as the lack of commitment from either partner, third-party tort liability, 
scarce guarantees provided by the government in the process of collaboration (Li et al., 
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2005), a staff crisis or inadequate distribution of responsibilities and risks that are not 
regulated in the contract (Bing et al., 2005; Li et al., 2005).  
The confidence generated by the contracting party, in this case the public sector, 
is generated by transparent governments where government power is limited and 
restricted; where corruption is prosecuted; where there are guarantees to carry out the 
PPP, despite changes in government or laws; and where there is confidence of the 
society in their politicians and absence of irregular payments or bribes in public 
procurement (World Economic Forum, 2017). Precisely, circumstances, such as 
unforeseen legislative changes, changes in the regulation of taxes and in the regulation 
of the sectors are risk factors for implementing PPPs (Li et al., 2005; Mota and Moreira, 
2015; Shen et al., 2006). Casady et al. (2019) refer to this as PPP institutional maturity, 
which is an important determinant of successful execution and management of PPPs  
and rests on the public sector’s ‘legitimacy, trust, and capacity’. Trust is precisely one 
of the key features in the governance of inter-organizational relationships (Osborne, 
2006). 
Therefore, the trust between the parties, and especially the contracting government and 
its integrity, allows the reduction of uncertainty of all those aspects that are not possible 
to regulate at the time of the formalisation of the contract (Mota and Moreira, 2015; 
Zheng et al., 2008). Similarly, in the absence of confidence of the private party towards 
the public one, the private party will prefer to exercise greater control of the 
organizational form by integrating a larger set of its operations in an organizational 
form that facilitates it (Chiles and McMackin, 1996). Precisely, previous studies 
highlight the importance of the credibility and integrity of the public party for PPPs 
carried out in developing countries such as China (Yang et al, 2013), Sri-Lanka 
(Appuhami et al, 2011), Sierra Leone ( Harris et al, 2012) or Ghana (Ameyab and Chan, 
12 
 
2015); as well as in literature reviews focused on other developing economies (Kostyak 
et al, 2017). Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1c (H1c). The higher the behavioural uncertainty from the public party 
where the PPP is carried out, the higher the control of the private party through the type 
of PPP adopted.  
2.4. Asset specificity 
Another relevant characteristic that is related to uncertainty is the degree of specificity 
acquired by the asset being transacted (Williamson, 1979). In general, when the 
contracting party goes to the market, the object of exchange would be adapted by the 
contracted party to meet certain requirements; thus, it acquires a different degree of 
adaptation to comply with the customer (e.g., specific infrastructures like highways or 
water supply works) (Besanko et al., 2009). This characteristic is important because 
once the transaction is agreed upon and a specific degree of specificity is acquired, there 
may be opportunistic behaviour by the contractor (e.g., the contractor refuses to pay 
what is agreed upon) or the contracted party (e.g., delivery of low-quality 
infrastructures), creating an obstruction for the most disadvantaged party (Williamson, 
1985).  
In general, the greater the specificity of the necessary assets in the productive 
process, the greater the vulnerability of the contracting party to opportunistic behaviour 
on the part of the contracted party (De Schepper et al., 2015) since it could increase the 
prices or decrease the level or quality of services (Ellram et al., 2008). To avoid this 
risk, the provision of these assets through the market would be the least efficient option 
for the final economic agent to accept (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Thus, the TCT 
suggests that activities involving higher uncertainty and specific assets should be 
internalised (Besanko et al., 2009; Williamson, 1985).  
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PPP cases usually present high transaction costs through the market, although 
the lack of funding and technical skills may pull public managers towards outsourcing 
them to the private sector (Edkins and Smyth, 2006; Li et al., 2005). According to the 
TCT, the higher the specificity of the service or product provided by PPPs, the higher 
the risk associated with the transaction (Jin and Doloi, 2008; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1993; Williamson, 1985). As a result, the public party will tend to adopt a specific PPP, 
in which more risks are transferred to the private party when the presence of specificity 
of the transaction is greater. In fact, studies performed in developing economies as in 
China include the asset specificity as an important factor in PPPs (Wang et al, 2018). 
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The higher the asset specificity of the transaction, the higher the 
control of the private party through the type of PPP adopted.  






3. Research method 
3.1. Variables 
Following previous studies (Oxley, 1999; Santoro and McGill, 2005), we approach the 
type of PPP with an ordinal variable from the World Bank PPP Database. We analyse 
this variable decomposed into two forms in order to check the robustness of the results: 
one form is aggregated and the other form is disaggregated into more subtypes. Both 
variables are ordered according to the World Bank, from the lowest control taken by the 
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private party up to the highest control (see Appendix). The first proxy, the Governance 
Structure (GovS), has a range of four values: (1) Management and Lease Contracts, (2) 
Brownfield, (3) Greenfield Projects and (4) Divestitures. The second proxy, the 
Governance Structure Subtype (GovSS), ranges from the following: (1) Management 
contract; (2) Lease contract; (3) Rehabilitate, operate and transfer & Rehabilitate, lease 
or rent, and transfer; (4) Build, rehabilitate, operate and transfer; (5) Build, operate and 
transfer; (6) Build, own and operate; (7) Merchant and Rental; to (8) Partial and (9) full 
divestiture.  
Regarding the external uncertainty (David and Han, 2004), the market or 
environmental uncertainty within national boundaries is proxied by the degree of 
development of the countries through gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
(Balassa, 1985; Mota and Moreira, 2015; Skidmore and Toya, 2002). Since many 
variables (e.g., educational and infrastructure level, macroeconomic stability, etc.) are 
correlated with the degree of development of the country, the use of a proxy for this set 
of factors avoids severe multicollinearity and facilitates interpretation (Ramírez and 
Fleta, 2016; Svensson, 1998). Thus, the variable, Development Degree (Dev), is 
obtained for each country, according to the year before the project started, to represent 
this development applying logs to the GDP per capita (Ramírez and Fleta, 2016) as 
previously used to proxy favourable conditions for economic transactions in PPPs 
(Albalate et al, 2014; Wang et al, 2018b).  
The source of uncertainty related to the possibility of an unfulfilled contract is 
proxied by the International Property Rights Index (PropR) from the Heritage 
Foundation. It measures the degree to which a country’s laws protect private property 
rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It contains the level 
of physical and intellectual property rights, strength of investor protection and quality of 
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land administration with values from 0 to 100. The index is largely used to analyse 
national contexts (Javorcik, 2004) and other similar indices have been used in PPPs’ 
research (Cardenas et al., 2017; Mota and Moreira, 2015; Panayides et al., 2015).  
The source of uncertainty related to the behaviour of the government contractor 
is proxied by the Government Integrity Index (GovInt), also from the Heritage 
Foundation. It contains the systemic corruption of government institutions and decision 
making by such practices as bribery, extortion, nepotism, cronyism, patronage, 
embezzlement and graft (Jin, 2009). The lack of government integrity caused by such 
practices reduces economic vitality by increasing costs and shifting resources into 
unproductive lobbying activities (Nisar, 2013). The index is largely used to analyse 
national contexts and investment decisions (World Economic Forum, 2017; Carbonara 
et al., 2014; Cardenas et al., 2017), and its values range from 0 to 100.  
Asset Specificity refers to investments in assets that are dedicated to a particular 
supplier and whose redeployment entails considerable switching costs (Williamson, 
1985; Wu et al., 2017). There are several sources of specificity, such as: the location, 
scale, human resources and the physical assets used for the projected economic activity 
(Besanko et al., 2009; Milgrom and Roberts, 1993). Given that PPPs are unique projects 
by nature, where the service is performed and specifically tailored to the government 
that contracts it, and there is the existence of location specificities per se, the physical 
assets and the scale used are especially important. In fact, the studies in which Likert 
scale surveys are used to assess the magnitude ask in particular about the volume of 
physical assets dedicated (Abdi and Aulak, 2012). Thus, in this PPP study, the asset 
specificity is proxied by the total physical assets dedicated to the investment (Alvarez, 
2010; De Schepper et al., 2015; Lieberman, 1991; Wu et al., 2017). For this purpose, 
the variable used as a proxy for this characteristic is labelled as Physical Asset 
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(PhyInv) investments recorded in millions of US dollars (USD) in either the year of 
financial closure or year of investment (obtained from the World Bank database). The 
advantage of this proxy is that it is an objective measure for projects carried out over 
time in different countries, in contrast to the different perceptions that the people who 
answer the surveys may have.  
Since some PPPs are popularised at different times, and since there are sectors 
where their maturity and regulation as well as the economic structure of the region 
affect them (Cui et al., 2018), typical control variables for the investment year, specific 
economic sectors and continents are included as dummy variables (Oxley, 1999). For 
the time control variables, four dummy variables are established in symmetric cohorts 
from the year to be checked that offers enough observations: year 2000 (Y2000), year 
2005 (Y2005), year 2010 (Y2010) and year 2015 (Y2015). The variables take the value 
of one when the project was carried out in that year and zero otherwise. For the sector 
variables, two variables are included to control the most popular sectors studied, such as 
the transportation sector (STransp) and the energy sector (SEnergy) (Cui et al., 2018). 
They reach the values of one when the project was carried out in its sector and zero 
otherwise. For the continents variables, the projects carried out in Europe (EU), Africa 
(AFR) and Asia (ASIA) are grouped, taking the value of one if they were located in that 
continent and zero otherwise.  
3.2. Methods and models 
To test the hypotheses, since the response variable is the governance structure 
and has different ordered levels, an ordinal logistic regression is used (Oxley, 1999; 
Santoro and McGill, 2005; Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).  
Thus, Models 1 to 4 include the type of PPP in four levels. Model 1 includes 
only the control variables, Model 2 includes only the variables of the hypotheses, Model 
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3 includes the variables of the hypotheses and part of the control variables and, finally, 
Model 4 includes all the control and hypotheses variables.  
To analyse the robustness of the results, Models 5 to 10 are used. Thus, Models 
5, 7 and 9 include the hypotheses and control variables of Model 3, considering that 
PPPs can be nested in countries, regions and continents (Model 5), in countries and 
regions (Model 7) or only in countries (Model 9). Similarly, Models 6, 8 and 10 check 
the same nesting levels and variables, decomposing the type of PPP into nine levels. 
The specification model shown in linear format, including the variables presented, is as 
follows: 
𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝑖𝑖 = β0 + β1𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐆𝐆𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏i + β2𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆i + β3𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐆𝐆i + β4𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐢𝐢 + 𝛃𝛃𝟓𝟓𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐢𝐢 + 𝛃𝛃𝟔𝟔𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝟓𝟓𝐢𝐢
+ 𝛃𝛃𝟕𝟕𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐢𝐢 + 𝛃𝛃𝟖𝟖𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝟓𝟓𝐢𝐢 + 𝛃𝛃𝟗𝟗𝐆𝐆𝐒𝐒𝐆𝐆𝐃𝐃𝐏𝐏𝐒𝐒𝐏𝐏𝐢𝐢 + 𝛃𝛃𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐆𝐆𝐒𝐒𝐏𝐏𝐒𝐒𝐆𝐆𝐒𝐒𝐏𝐏𝐢𝐢 + 𝛃𝛃𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐒𝐒𝐄𝐄𝐢𝐢
+ 𝛃𝛃𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐀𝐏𝐏𝐢𝐢 + 𝛃𝛃𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐘𝐀𝐀𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐆𝐀𝐀𝐢𝐢 + ui 
where GovSi is the dependent variable of the governance structure of each PPP 
for each project, which can reach the value of 1 for the lowest hierarchical form up to 4, 
the highest hierarchical form. The subscript i corresponds to each one of the projects 
carried out in an specific year, t (i = 1,…, n). The variables related to the uncertainty, 
PropRi (H1a), GovInti (H1b) and Devi (H1c) reach the value the previous year of the 
investment, t-1, since the investment is performed considering the previous situation. 
The variable related to the specificity hypothesis PhyInvi (H2) represents the investment 
dedicated to the physical assets. After that, the control variables, time (Y2000i, Y2005i, 
Y2010i, Y2015i), sector (SEnergyi and STranspi) as well as location (EUi, AFRi, ASIAi) 
are included. Finally, the βs are the parameters to be estimated, and u is the random 
disturbance that is logistically distributed.  
In addition, the data could be nested; the projects are carried out in countries 
with their own contexts, which are related to the country variables used.  In multilevel 
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models, the random part of the model is more complex to account for the hierarchical 
structure of the data (Hox, 1998). Consider a single observation, GovSijk. The 
observation deviates from its continent mean by an amount that we will denote eijk. The 
observation’s continent mean deviates from the region’s mean uij, and the observation’s 
regional mean deviates from the fixed part of the model, μ, by an amount that we will 
denote as ui. Thus, the observation’s residual is decomposed into three parts or 
components that describe its magnitude relative to the continent, region and country 
means. Calculating this set of residuals for each observation, we could estimate the 
variability of those residuals and make distributional assumptions about them. Thus, the 
random part of the dependent variable would be as follows: GovS𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.  
3.3. Data Set 
To test the hypotheses related to uncertainty (i.e., H1a, H1b and H1c) and asset 
specificity (H2), we use the public access World Bank Project Database of PPPs 
(WBPD) as well as indexes from the Heritage Foundation for the country level in the 
previous investment year.  The WBPD collects the information exclusively from 
publicly available sources, which include commercial news database, specialized and 
industry publications, government websites and reports or multilateral development 
agencies, including projects from low and middle-income countries from 1986 until 
now. For instance, the country with the highest GDP per capita is Russia (16,007 US 
dollars per capita) and the minimum is the Democratic Republic of Congo (102 US 
dollars per capita). 
The final set without missing data contains 11,821 infrastructure projects from 
different sectors in 110 countries, collected from 1997 to 2017. The data come from 
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countries considered by World Bank as developing economies and their distribution of 
PPPs by country is shown in Figure 3. 
The set includes the type and subtype governance structure of each PPP project, 
as well as their amount of physical assets. The type of governance structure as the 
dependent variable, divided into four thresholds, contains the following observations in 
each category: 232 (Management and Lease contract), 2,342 (Brownfield), 7,567 
(Greenfield) and 1,680 (Divestiture) observations, respectively. The subtype of 
Governance Structure as the dependent variable, divided into nine thresholds, contains 
the following observations in each category: Management contract (91); Lease contract 
(141); Rehabilitate, operate and transfer & Rehabilitate, lease or rent, and transfer (679); 
Build, rehabilitate, operate and transfer (1,690); Build, operate and transfer (2,043); 
Build, own and operate (1,937); Merchant and Rental (3,560); Partial (1,252) and full 
divestitures (428) observations, respectively. 
Table 1 summarises the descriptive statistics included in the models, and Table 2 
displays the matrix of correlations and individual VIF values that range from 1.02 to 
2.18, less than the limit of 10 suggested for multiple regressions models (Kennedy, 
1992; Studenmund, 1992) and the stricter limit of 5.3 (Hair et al., 1998). These results 
show that there is no presence of multicollinearity problems. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the dataa 
Variables Label Median Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Dependent Variables       
Governance Structure  GovS 3 2.904 0.640 1 4 
Governance Struc. Subtype GovSS 6 5.904 1.639 1 9 
Independent variables 
H1 
a) Property Rights  PropR  50 40.356 13.368 5 90 
b) 
Government 
Integrity  GovInt  31 31.252 9.272 4 70 
c) Development Degree  Dev  7.880 7.781 1.044 4.631 9.680 
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H2  Physical Investments  PhyInv 46.300 166.339 401.891 0 14800 
Control variables 
Time 
Year 2000  Y2000 0 0.044 0.207 0 1 
Year 2005  Y2005 0 0.059 0.236 0 1 
Year 2010  Y2010 0 0.050 0.218 0 1 
Year 2015  Y2015 0 0.027 0.164 0 1 
Sector 
Sector Energy  SEnergy 0 0.376 0.484 0 1 
Sector Transport STransp 0 0.144 0.351 0 1 
Continent 
Europe (EU) EU 0 0.110 0.313 0 1 
Africa (AFR) AFR 0 0.134 0.341 0 1 
Asia (ASIA) ASIA 0 0.412 0.492 0 1 
 








Table 2. Correlation Matrix and individual Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) valuesa 
 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 VIF 
1.GovS                
2.GovSS 0.893*               
3.PropR  -0.131* -0.086*             1.43 
4.GovInt  -0.007* -0.149* 0.455*            1.67 
5.Dev  -0.076* -0.145* 0.150* 0.424*           2.18 
6.PhyInv 0.046* 0.032* 0.070* 0.057* 0.152*          1.06 
7.Y2000 0.004     0.0214* 0.126* -0.046* -0.086* -0.032*         1.05 
8.Y2005 -0.008 -0.005 -0.068* -0.044* -0.097* -0.037* -0.054*        1.02 
9.Y2010 0.000 0.011 -0.048* 0.001 0.026* 0.057* -0.049* -0.057*       1.02 
10.Y2015 -0.036* -0.074* -0.007 0.051* 0.150* 0.033* -0.036* -0.042* -0.038*      1.05 
11.SEnergy 0.042* -0.115* 0.036* 0.166* 0.224* 0.002 -0.042* -0.043* 0.008 0.101*     1.27 
12.STransp -0.370* -0.442* 0.123* 0.056* 0.003 0.071* 0.008 -0.008 0.008 0.013 -0.319*    1.37 
13.EU 0.179* 0.209* -0.138* -0.117* 0.130* -0.009 0.001 -0.011 -0.000 -0.051* -0.091* -0.117*   1.33 
14.AFR 0.052* 0.135* -0.064* -0.062* -0.336* -0.031* -0.004 0.043* 0.007 -0.020* -0.176* -0.075* -0.138*  1.81 
15.ASIA -0.010 -0.098* -0.121* -0.038* -0.334* 0.004 -0.049* 0.001 0.026* 0.012 0.041* 0.076* -0.295* -0.330* 1.95 
 
a N= 11821 










Table 3 provides the statistics of four models that include only the control variables (see 
Model 1), only the hypotheses (see Model 2), as well as the hypotheses with part of the 
control variables (see Model 3) and with all the control variables (see Model 4).  
Results show that, in all models, the likelihood ratio χ2 with a p-value less than 
0.001 means that the models as a whole are statistically significant, as compared to the 
null model with no predictors. The intercepts, shown at the bottom of the output, 
indicate where the latent variable is cut to configure the four groups that we observe in 
our data. Coefficients of each parameter represent the log odds in order to show the sign 
of the variables (i.e., instead of showing odds ratios, which coefficients would be 
positive for all the parameters), with their standard errors in parentheses. For example, 
in Model 4, for a one-unit increase in property rights (i.e., going from 0 to 1), we expect 
a -0.01 decrease in the log odds of being in a higher level of the governance structure, 
given that all of the other variables in the model are held constant.  
Thus, according to Model 4, the property rights (𝛽𝛽1 = -0.0119, p <0.001) and 
degree of development (𝛽𝛽3 = -0.1639, p < 0.001) variables are negative and significant.  
This means that we cannot reject the formulated H1a or H1c hypotheses. Therefore, an 
increase in the value of these variables (or a reduction in the uncertainty generated by 
the enforcement of contracts and the development degree) would cause a lesser need to 
control the activities of the private sector through a governance structure.  
Another interesting result is the positive and significant relationship of the 
physical assets to the governance structure (𝛽𝛽4 = 0.0004, p < 0.001). This result shows 
that the greater the presence of physical assets employed, which approximate the 
specificity of the transaction, the greater the control that companies try to have over 
them through greater supervision. Thus, H2 would not be rejected.  
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Finally, Model 4 shows that there is significant and positive relationship 
between the GovInt (𝛽𝛽2) and the GovS variables, opposite as it was expected. In 
addition, Models 2 and 3, show a positive relationship but not significant. Thus, the H1b 
proposed would be rejected. Regarding the control variables, specifically for Y2015, 
sectors and continents are significant in all models; and the Y2005 also excepting in 
Model 4. 
The results together, specifically the rejection of H1b with the fact that the data 
of the observations may be grouped into hierarchical units (e.g. countries in the first 
level) and that in the present work the projects are nested in countries with similar 





Table 3. Ordinal Logit Analysis: type governance structure as the dependent variable 
 
Terms Label Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Hypotheses variables      
Property Rights PropR   -0.0205 (0.00)*** -0.0155 (0.00)*** -0.0119 (0.00)*** 
Government Integrity   GovInt   -0.0001 (0.00) 0.0040 (0.00) 0.0059 (0.00)* 
Development Degree  Dev   -0.1444 (0.01)*** -0.1501 (0.02)*** -0.1639 (0.02)*** 
Physical Investments  PhyInv  0.0003 (0.00)*** 0.0005 (0.00)*** 0.0004 (0.00)*** 
Control variables      
Year 2000  Y2000 0.0047 (0.09)  0.0468 (0.09) 0.0515 (0.09) 
Year 2005  Y2005 -0.1015 (0.08)*  -0.1830 (0.08)* -0.1536 (0.08) 
Year 2010  Y2010 -0.0144 (0.08)  -0.0640 (0.08) -0.0701 (0.08) 
Year 2015  Y2015 -0.2786 (0.11)*  -0.3101 (0.11)** -0.2308 (0.11)* 
Sector Energy  SEnergy -0.3080 (0.04)***  -0.3979 (0.04)*** -0.2738 (0.04)*** 
Sector Transport STransp -2.3914 (0.06)***  -2.5247 (0.06)*** -2.4036 (0.06)*** 
Europe EU 1.3639 (0.07)***   1.2542 (0.07)*** 
Africa AFR 0.5528 (0.06)***   0.2596 (0.07)** 
Asia ASIA 0.4965 (0.04)***   0.2539 (0.05)*** 
Intercept 1  -4.5632 (0.08)*** -5.8753(0.16)*** -6.6224 (0.17)*** -6.2345 (0.23)*** 
Intercept 2  -1.5430 (0.04)*** -3.2063 (0.14)*** -3.5993 (0.15)*** -3.1877 (0.22)*** 
Intercept 3  2.0288 (0.04)*** -0.0512 (0.14)*** -0.0752 (0.15)*** 0.4242 (0.22)*** 
Likelihood Ratio χ2  2422.61*** 336.27*** 2275.31*** 2585.81*** 
Log Likelihood  -10145.37 -11188.54 -10219.02 -10063.77 
Pseudo R2  0.1067 0.0148 0.1002 0.1138 
Observations (n)  11821 11821 11821 11821 
Notes:  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Type governance structure coded in four levels: Management and lease contract =1, Brownfield=2, Greenfield 3, Divestiture =4 (Appendix Table 5). 
Bold format applied in significant results related to the Hypotheses proposed. 
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4.1. Robustness analyses 
To check the robustness of the results, two additional analyses are added to the ordinal 
logistic regression. On the one hand, a multilevel ordinal regression analysis was 
applied to elucidate any hierarchical structure in the levels of data collected. Multilevel 
models enabled us to evaluate how much of the variance in a PPP was attributable to 
individual circumstances and how much to the conditions of a given level where the 
projects are nested (i.e., country, region and continent). On the other hand, we conduct 
the multilevel analysis with the four levels of type of PPP previously analysed, as well 
as decomposing the GovS into nine levels to check if the grouped results are consistent.  
Thus, a model is specified to include cluster-level random effects to account for 
similarities within clusters, and the observations are assumed to be independently 
conditional on the random effects (see Table 4). A random intercept captures level 
differences in the dependent variable across clusters (due to unobserved cluster-level 
covariates), considering four levels: continents, regions, countries and PPPs (see Models 
5 and 6); three levels: regions, countries and PPPs (see Models 7 and 8); and two levels: 
countries and PPPs (see Models 9 and 10). On the other hand, Models 5, 7 and 9 
correspond to the GovS with four ordinal categories, while Models 6, 8 and 10 are the 
ones with the GovS decomposed into nine ordinal categories. Since the continent level 
is controlled by the multilevel technique, we exclude continent control variables from 
the models. The integration model used is the mean-variance adaptive Gauss–Hermite 
quadrature.  
Table 4 results show that, in all models, the Wald chi-square is statistically 
significant, as compared to the null model with no predictors. Furthermore, the 
likelihood ratio (LR) test compared with the ordinal logit regression indicates that all 
the multilevel models are more conveniently considered hierarchically. In addition, we 
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perform the LR test to check which of the nested models fits better. Thus, once the 
nested regressions are performed, the LR test suggests that the best nested model is the 
two-level model: PPPs nested in countries according to Models 9 and 10 (LR χ2 Models 
10 vs 8= 3.61; 9 vs 7 = 4.16; 8 vs 6= 2.27; 7 vs 5= 2.00). Even though the LR tests 
indicate that Models 9 and 10 fit better, all Models from 5 to 10 present very similar 
coefficients estimated and the same sign and significance of the variables related to the 
hypotheses.  
For instance, in Model 9, we find both property rights (𝛽𝛽1 = -0.0101, p < 0.001), 
physical asset variables (𝛽𝛽4 = 0.0005, p < 0.001) and the degree of development (𝛽𝛽3 = -
0.1361, p < 0.01) are significant in the same direction as the non-nested ordinal 
regression model and the hypotheses proposed. Similarly, the governmental integrity 
variable is not as significant (𝛽𝛽2 = 0.0036) as in the non-nested model. Finally, in 
Model 9, the 'variance component’ or random parameter that estimates the variability 
accounted for by each level of the hierarchy, reaches the value of 0.7057.  
Additional analyses were performed. For reasons of space, these analyses are not 
incorporated into the work and can be requested from the authors. We used other proxy 
for environment uncertainty (log of annual GDP in current dollars), as well as the total 
assets and the physical ones divided by the total to proxy the asset specificity, finding 
the same results in terms of sign and significance of the coefficients related to the 
hypotheses. Models 5 to 10 were performed by introducing the control variables of the 
continents, as in Models 1 to 4. In the same way, a multilevel ordinal logistic regression 
analysis was carried out with different integration methods, such as the mode-curvature 
adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature, non-adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature and 
Laplacian approximation. The same Models were repeated, allowing for the country 
variables (i.e., property rights, degree of development and integrity of the government) 
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with random effects (i.e., a different slope) variable by variable, separately and jointly, 
as well as models where the variables of the hypotheses that are not significant are 
excluded. In addition, the models were contrasted, including dichotomous variables for 
the years 1997 and 2007, to control for global economic cycle. In all cases, the same 
results were found for the variables of the hypotheses in significance and sign. 
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Table 4. Multilevel Ordinal Logistic Regressions: type governance structures as dependent variablesa  
Nested Levels Continent > Region > Country Region > Country Country Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Hypothesis Variables       
PropR -.0065 (0.00)** -0.0110 (0.00)*** -0.0103 (0.00)** -0.0110 (0.00)*** -0.0101 (0.00)*** -0.0108 (0.00)*** 
GovInt 0.0039 (0.00) 0.0023 (0.00) 0.0034 (0.00) 0.0022 (0.00) 0.0036 (0.00) 0.0022 (0.00) 
Dev -0.1567 (0.04)*** -0.1794 (0.03)*** -0.1525 (0.04)*** -0.1782 (0.03)*** -0.1361 (0.04)** -0.1653 (0.03)*** 
PhyInv 0.0005 (0.00)*** 0.0004 (0.00)*** 0.0005 (0.00)*** 0.0004 (0.00)*** 0.0005 (0.00)*** 0.0004 (0.00)*** 
Control Variables       
Y2000 0.1003 (0.10) 0.1189 (0.08) 0.1017 (0.10) 0.1197 (0.08) 0.1084 (0.10) 0.1249 (0.08) 
Y2005 -0.1351 (0.08) -0.1208 (0.07) -0.1348 (0.08) -0.1210 (0.07) -0.1305 (0.08) -0.1173 (0.07) 
Y2010 -0.0614 (0.09) -0.0398 (0.07) -0.0627 (0.09) -0.0407 (0.07) -0.0674 (0.09) -0.0441 (0.07) 
Y2015 -0.3981 (0.11)** -0.4295 (0.09)*** -0.4021 (0.11)** -0.4311 (0.09)*** -0.4105 (0.11)** -0.4369 (0.09)*** 
SEnergy -0.0088 (0.05) -1.1012 (0.04)*** -0.0083 (0.05) -1.0999 (0.04)*** -0.0093 (0.05) -1.1018 (0.04)*** 
STransp -2.3593 (0.06)*** -3.4950 (0.06)*** -2.3582 (0.06)*** -3.4938 (0.06)*** -2.3583 (0.06)*** -3.4949 (0.06)*** 
Intercept 1 -7.0197 (0.38)*** -9.3889 (0.34)*** -6.9594 (0.36)*** -9.3402 (0.29)*** -6.8044 (0.34)*** -9.2277 (0.30)*** 
Intercept 2 -3.7959 (0.38)*** -8.4352 (0.33)*** -3.7352 (0.35)*** -8.3865 (0.28)*** -3.5796 (0.33)*** -8.2739 (0.29)*** 
Intercept 3 0.1488 (0.37)* -6.8230 (0.32)*** 0.2093 (0.34)* -6.7742 (0.30)*** 0.3644 (0.32)* -6.6611 (0.28)*** 
Intercept 4  -5.1775 (0.32)***  -5.1286 (0.30)***  -5.0149 (0.28)*** 
Intercept 5  -3.8028 (0.32)***  -3.7537 (0.29)***  -3.6397 (0.28)*** 
Intercept 6  -2.6047 (0.32)***  -2.5554 (0.29)***  -2.4416 (0.28)*** 
Intercept 7  -0.4769 (0.32)*  -0.4277 (0.29)*  -0.3143 (0.27)* 
Intercept 8  1.0776 (0.32)**  1.1266 (0.29)***  1.2398 (0.28)*** 
Random 
parameters 




















Wald χ2 1553.41*** 3038.15*** 1552.35*** 3035.81*** 1549.73*** 3033.71*** 
LR test vs. Ologit 1288.03*** 1840.38*** 1286.03*** 1838.11*** 1281.87*** 1834.50*** 
Observations 11821 11821 11821 11821 11821 11821 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.25 0.10 0.25 0.12 0.26 
a Notes:  
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Governance structure with 4 or 9 levels. See Appendix. 
The number of groups in each level analysis include 5 continents, 17 regions and 110 countries, hierarchically nested in each other from the latter to the first one. 




Regarding the characteristics of the transaction, both the theoretical approaches and the 
empirical studies support the notion that asset specificity affects the way in which the 
transaction is managed (De Schepper et al., 2015; Wu et al 2017). Thus, PPPs that 
present greater specificities tend to adopt contractual forms in which the party (the 
private one) that carries out the investment has a greater control (Benítez-Ávila, 2018; 
Wu et al., 2017). When the private party faces a PPP, the bigger the investment, the 
higher the part of the property of the assets involved in the transaction that the private 
party should retain. This way, the private party reduces the potential losses caused by 
opportunism of the public party.  
About the uncertainties in which the investment is carried out, the TCT exposes 
their importance in the management of the PPP (De Schepper et al., 2015; Wang et al., 
2018, 2018b). Among them, the relevance of the external uncertainties (mainly arising 
from market environments) stands out (Albalate et al, 2014; Mota and Moreira, 2015). 
In fact, in our study, we find that the uncertainty of the environment, proxy trough the 
level of development of the economies, influence the type of PPP adopted. These results 
are in the same line of those found by Wang et al (2018). These authors study a sample 
of 705 projects in China and observe that higher transactions costs can increase the 
control of the private partnerships. 
Another source of uncertainty may arise from the enforcement of the contracts. 
This uncertainty is related with the legal framework (Panayides et al., 2015) since it 
depends on the location in which the PPP tries to govern the transaction (Lu et al., 
2015). Thus, the relationship between legal environments and increased investment in 
port PPPs has been studied for large groups of developing countries (Panayides et al., 
2015), as well as various projects in the EU (Mota and Moreira, 2015), finding positive 
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and significant relationships. In the present work, in line with other findings in previous 
literature (Cardenas et al., 2017), the importance of the institutional environment in the 
way of managing PPPs is pointed out. In particular, property rights are shown as a 
variable that influences the type of PPP adopted, so that the more protection is granted 
by the regulatory framework where the transaction takes place, the more the private 
party delegates to the market aspects that are controlled by this institutional framework.  
Thus, according to the TCT and the present empirical study, the specificity of 
the assets and uncertainty related to markets and legal frameworks, not only imply a 
greater degree of control from the private party, but also imply that this control can be 
established in a staggered way through different types of PPPs.  
However, regarding the GovInt variable, our results indicate that this source of 
uncertainty related to trust does not affect the final configuration of the PPP governance. 
Studies such as Benítez-Ávila et al. (2018) did not find a positive relationship between 
the government positive orientation towards PPPs and higher private participation in 
them. Other studies on PPPs relate the trust between the parties with the best climate of 
cooperation and performance (Warsen et al., 2018). Lu et al. (2015) prove that 
contractual governance is more effective than relational governance through trust to 
improve project performance. However, our focus is different from previous studies 
since we implement the analyses from the contracted perspective party.  
Our findings show that behavioural uncertainty on the public party may be 
irrelevant if the legal context for contracting guarantees an adequate enforcement and 
fulfilment of contracts. This empirical evidence could be due to the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda (Von Glahn and Taulbee, 2017), for which a developed and reliable legal 
framework is enough for the fulfilment of the agreement. Under a deficient rule of law, 
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a significant behavioural uncertainty on the public party may cause difficulties for PPPs 
development.  
Thus, not all kinds of uncertainties would affect in the same way the governance 
structure of a PPP. Sources should be decomposed in order to not to have spurious 
relationships. Our results seem to indicate that the ease of enforcing the contract 
because of the property rights level and the degree of development of the country, other 
forms of uncertainty are less relevant.  
6. Conclusions  
The analyses carried out in this paper recommend addressing the peculiarities of each 
transaction according to the uncertainty related to the market conditions (i.e. external 
uncertainty) and legal framework (i.e. contractual uncertainty), as well as the investment 
specificity, in order to analyse the PPP type convenience. Our results show that the 
greater the specificity and uncertainty in the project, the greater the control of the 
project in hands of the private party of the PPP. Whether this choice is made by the 
public sector or induced by the private party, the election eases the viability of the PPP, 
avoiding that contracting procedures result unsuccessful due to implicit costs of the 
transaction.  
Thus, in general, there is an alignment between transaction characteristics, 
context where it is located and governance structure adopted by a manager. These 
findings are complementary and compatible with international papers and guidelines on 
PPPs, shedding light on the importance of different aspects of the context where 
transaction takes place. Furthermore, trust and reliability to the public party does not 
seem to affect the type of PPP adopted. This may be because an adequate legal 
framework reduces uncertainty independently of the behavioural uncertainty from the 
public side. Analogously, the weaker the legal framework, the bigger the influence that 
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this uncertainty would have in the governance choice for the PPP.  These results are 
robust to individual location of the contract (continent, region, country) and also when 
decomposing the type of PPP into more cases.  
However, this study has several limitations that should be taken into account for 
future research. The first one is about the data used. Although the database is broad for 
many countries and from an international organisation, PPPs from countries with the 
highest degree of development are not included. Thus, we should be cautious with the 
generalisations of some of the results obtained in this paper. This means that the 
economic literature that suggests that there are factors at the country level, whose 
importance for economic activities depends on their level of economic development, 
must be taken into account in the argumentation of the hypotheses when dealing with 
these types of economies (Ramírez and Fleta, 2016). 
 The second limitation or caution is related to the variables used to prove some 
of the hypotheses. For instance, the results should be contrasted with other proxies (e.g. 
from International Transparency or Governance Indicators databases) instead the 
property rights and government integrity from Heritage Foundation. In the same way, it 
would be convenient to replicate the study with other variables used in the study related 
to the uncertainty of the environments. 
Third, although it is novel to analyse the private party’s trust in the public party, 
because the investigation is located in the private decision maker, the variable could be 
further refined if there are project-specific data that assesses the confidence of both 
parties (Benítez-Ávila et al., 2018; Warsen et al., 2018). 
These limitations, derived of the available information, show that further 
research would provide additional results by combining factors that affect different 
levels, such as those of the company that manages the project, as for example, the 
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trustworthiness towards the private party (Kostyak et al, 2017), its technical expertise 
(Ameyab and Chan, 2015) or previous experience (Galilea and Medda, 2010); or 
additional characteristics of the specific project and other proxies to assess the 
specificity assumed by the private party.  
Besides, since our findings indicate nested behaviours, regional idiosyncrasies of 
PPP forms between geographical areas need more exploration in order to detect other 
types of regional effects (e.g., economic areas, geophysical similarities, etc.).  
This wide-scope research could may well lead to research at a local level of 
institutional facilities and how these affect the type of PPP adopted. As noted by Torres 
and Pina (2001) or Kivilä et al. (2017), among others, there may be local government 





Table 5. Type of governance structure of Public-Private Partnerships 
Aggregated structure Disaggregated structure 
1.  Management and Lease contracts 
1. Management contract: Management contracts transfer 
responsibility for managing a utility to a private operator, 
often for three to five years. The ones considered PPPs are the 
ones that aim for efficiency by defining performance targets 
and basing the fee in part on their fulfilment. 
2. Lease contract. The term “lease” is used here for a class of 
arrangements under which an operator is responsible for 
operating and maintaining the business, but not for financing 
and investment 
2. Brownfield projects 
3. Rehabilitate, operate, and transfer. A private sponsor 
rehabilitates an existing facility, then operates and maintains 
the facility at its own risk for the contract period. 
4. Build, rehabilitate, operate and transfer. A private developer 
builds an add-on to an existing facility or completes a partially 
built facility and rehabilitates existing assets, then operates and 
maintains the facility at its own risk for the contract period. 
3. Greenfield projects 
5. Build, operate and transfer. A private sponsor builds a new 
facility at its own risk, owns and operates the facility at its own 
risk, then transfers the facility to the government at the end of 
the contract period. 
6. Build, own, and operate. A private sponsor builds a new 
facility at its own risk, then owns and operates the facility at its 
own risk. 
7. Merchant. A private sponsor builds a new facility in a 
liberalized market in which the government provides no 
revenue or payment guarantees. The private developer assumes 
construction, operating, and market risk for the project. Rental 
private sponsor places a new facility at its own risk, owns and 
operates the facility at its own risk. 
4. Divestiture projects 
8. Partial divestiture: The government transfers part of the 
equity in the state-owned company to private entities. The 
private stake may or may not imply private management of the 
facility. 
9. Full divestiture: The government transfers 100 percent of the 
equity in the state owned company to private entities. 
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